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タグ: ill-gotten wealth

  • Ill-Gotten Wealth in the Philippines: Clear Evidence Needed to Reclaim San Miguel Shares

    The Philippine Supreme Court addressed the complex issue of ill-gotten wealth linked to the Marcos regime, ruling that the Republic must provide concrete evidence, not just assumptions, to reclaim shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) allegedly acquired with misused coconut levy funds. The court emphasized that establishing that assets originated from the government through illegal means is crucial; mere associations or positions during the Marcos era aren’t sufficient for forfeiture, meaning, assets cannot simply be taken because someone once worked for the previous government. This case reinforces the necessity for meticulous proof in cases seeking to recover assets from a bygone era.

    Coconut Kingdom’s Fate: Did Cojuangco Illegally Use Farmers’ Funds to Control San Miguel?

    The case centers on Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., a prominent figure during the Marcos administration, and the claim that he improperly used funds intended for coconut farmers to acquire a substantial stake in SMC. The Republic sought to reclaim these shares, arguing they were ill-gotten and should be returned to the coconut farmers. These shares involved both those owned outright through dummy corporations (Cojuangco block), and those involved under investment funds intended for coco farmers, (CIIF block). Initially, several writs of sequestration – legal orders freezing assets – were issued against Cojuangco’s properties and shares. A lengthy legal battle ensued, with the Republic presenting arguments based on Cojuangco’s alleged abuse of power and violation of fiduciary duties as the head of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and a director of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA).

    However, as a legal drama unfolds, some points came into contention: whether Cojuangco’s position conferred a public duty, the specific flow of funds for buying the San Miguel shares, and if these shares really came from misallocated government money. For its case, the government side primarily relied on documents relating to Cojuangco’s work during the Marcos period, COA findings, previous trial records, among other, laws dealing with the coconut levy fund to sustain their assertions.

    To defend their interests in said action, Cojuangco’s team primarily centered their argument on his own admission that he secured some of the money from certain business loans and these loans turned such monies into private funds to his possession, hence, are not within the scope of public monies. They also claimed Cojuangco did not control all of the corporate blocks that claimed association with his name, that such claims of control and ownership were mostly from conjecture. And this is where much of the case stood between assertions.

    Central to the Court’s decision was its view that while coconut levy funds are indeed public resources, concrete proof was lacking to establish a direct link between these funds and Cojuangco’s acquisition of the SMC shares. The Sandiganbayan found this evidence insufficient because, after several reminders, UCPB was found never to have produced the books showing any direct connection between said borrowings and Cojuangco’s dealings in any trial the action sought resolution with. While prior court decision have deemed it necessary to obtain records related to UCPB’s finances to obtain definitive and strong support as well, this did not occur.

    The Republic also referenced, but failed to establish effectively that loans and advances in Cojuangco’s care and custody at any specific time and function were acquired by use of undue influence. Because evidence did not definitively reveal these points through records, sworn testimonial evidence, etc. there could be no finding beyond reasonable doubt regarding that line of points regarding undue acquisition of those same funds. The court stated that the failure to include a specific claim relating Cojuangco as an illicit actor would deny it recourse towards the money and/or shares said money went towards.

    As the State must not be “estopped,” their responsibility is therefore heightened, so the Sandigan could not act merely on the say of one entity with all the records that government at the time had or could demand.

    The ruling reinforces the need for petitioners seeking recourse on illegal taking as detailed above, to provide that they seek remedy within every step and form they deem in reach towards obtaining justice or equitable redress for damages to property obtained within specific circumstances, and the high obligation they have to do so or face potentially the inverse of justice through the negligent loss of claim.

    While Justice Brion notes a gross and possibly illegal mishandling of the action against Cojuangco, such a case would require that some sort of criminal motivation (bribery, conspiracy, intentional loss) etc. came to fruition, the proof of which fell to an unaddressed burden on the government plaintiff.

    Lastly, and what is perhaps the biggest failing with precedent for current and future actions relating similar cases in years past as well, comes in not making a clear picture that certain actions could or should now belong to one party and not the other due to any established rule relating their work and their roles given circumstance and established and reasonable duty as set by an ideal of a “good steward”.

    FAQs

    What was the core issue in this case? Whether assets traced to public money could be transferred to private hands and if specific proof of this link was crucial for their return to the state. At the same time, determine the specificities required to state that certain entities “knew or should have known” such sources where improper to possess under that rule.
    What did the Supreme Court ultimately decide? The Supreme Court ruled against the Republic, affirming the lower court’s decision that insufficient evidence connected the coconut levy funds directly to the SMC shares held by Cojuangco. To be very blunt, without showing the step-by-step process showing the illegal flow of money, the government side had little more to stand on than its own opinions to prove that it deserves something back in hand from someone to be designated “responsible”.
    Why was there a dispute over the writs of sequestration? The lifting of nine writs of sequestration initially issued on the SMC shares occurred due to technical irregularities in their issuance, like lacking the signatures of two PCGG commissioners; so, Cojuangco argued that that lack made them illegitimate and hence should be done away with. But they didn’t come up as reasons for the main suit nor did that technical side help him out, since he needed to further assert the legal basis towards why the land/asset under question legally existed his as it does.
    What did Cojuangco and his companies admit in their defense? Cojuangco admitted he was a public officer, was head of a bank in the martial law administration, and purchased shares from another party relating towards holdings on those shares. Those were considered admissions the judge was able to sustain towards considering it’s basis, as certain “good faith”.
    What funds were identified as the possible source of funds to acquire San Miguel Corporation? The funds in this legal case were limited to loan and credit claims from private corporations called the CIIF Oil Mills, among possible monies and actions from the PCA or the public. These links and what they could afford was not shown.
    What legal principle did the Republic cite in its arguments to be granted recourse on certain damages? Among numerous arguments involving that some damages were done to the overall national government, and its responsibility to sustain legal process. Further action was lost however in not proving if or which money really “bought shares, and if it may pertain as lost public damages”.
    Why didn’t the claim against these assets “constitute trust”? “The funds lent to Cojuangco did not need to be traced since any specific public end or specific loan purpose with direct connections to coconut business in particular.” Furthermore it would need be explained why he should answer for them per actions he was given (power of representation, signing power) in his business role with them.” Those duties could have potentially shifted from being about good investments and operations for the bank, but more focused towards Cojuangco’s sole interests.
    What should a “borrower show or reveal” to satisfy and show “good standing towards the loans claimed under due recourse” The actual facts would dictate what more information that was demanded; so the judge may have assumed and the high justices could not, that the basic loans claimed to exist for buying these shares, might not actually existed. So those basic facts relating what loans existed would need have been detailed. And if it so occurs that the lender now does something bad because he got a loan, those with rights on said loans at first had the claim under reasonable assumption to the proceeds of the profits that may develop from use of those specific secured actions, but because that was not pursued, there could be no case per basic procedural oversight with action and filing claim on that issue or those grounds to action as they were.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores that pursuing claims of ill-gotten wealth requires more than suspicion or historical connection. Solid evidence, showing the direct misuse of public funds, is crucial for any hopes to wrest assets from individuals even formerly connected to corrupt regimes. For both legal entities and those under governance, it reinforces the importance of meticulously establishing every component element and relationship towards achieving the greatest certainty of justice.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., G.R. NOS. 166859, 169203, 180702, April 12, 2011

  • State’s Right to Recover Ill-Gotten Wealth: Prescription Period Starts Upon Discovery of Offense

    The Supreme Court held that the prescriptive period for offenses related to the acquisition of behest loans, considered ill-gotten wealth, begins to run from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the date of the transaction itself. This ruling emphasizes the State’s right to recover unlawfully acquired properties, ensuring that those who benefited from illegal loans cannot evade prosecution by claiming the statute of limitations. This decision reinforces accountability and transparency in government transactions, aiming to prevent corrupt practices.

    Behest Loans: When Does the Clock Start Ticking on State Recovery?

    This case revolves around a complaint filed by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) against several individuals, including officers and board members of the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), as well as stockholders and officers of Golden Country Farms, Inc. (GCFI). The Committee alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Sections 3(e) and 3(g), relating to corrupt practices of public officers.

    The crux of the issue lies in determining when the prescriptive period for these offenses begins. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, arguing that the offenses had already prescribed since more than ten years had elapsed from the time of their commission. The Committee, however, contended that the prescriptive period should be counted from the time of discovery of the behest loans, which was sometime in 1992 when the Committee was constituted. Section 3(e) involves causing undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving unwarranted benefits to any private party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Section 3(g) prohibits a public officer from entering into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government that is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that for offenses involving the acquisition of behest loans, it was virtually impossible for the State to have known about the violations at the time the transactions were made. This is because public officials often conspire with the beneficiaries of the loans. Consequently, the Court affirmed that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the day of the commission itself. Building on this principle, the Court cited prior jurisprudence, highlighting that in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense, which occurred in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.

    Building on this precedent, the Court considered the allegations regarding violations of Section 3(e) and Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, breaking it down into pre-takeover and post-takeover transactions. With respect to the pre-takeover transactions, the Court explained that a Section 3(e) violation requires injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits to private parties who conspire with public officers, while Section 3(g) does not require such benefits, focusing instead on transactions grossly disadvantageous to the government. For the post-takeover transactions, only a violation of Section 3(g) would be applicable, because, after the government had taken over GCFI, the element of private party unwarranted benefits under 3(e) disappeared.

    The court criticized the Ombudsman’s failure to properly resolve the issues, stating that the lack of injury suffered by the Government was erroneously based solely on the takeover. At the very least, the unpaid loans were indicative of damage suffered. More importantly, the Court stated that “injury to the Government is only required to support a charge under Section 3(e), but not under Section 3(g), of R.A. No. 3019.” Ultimately, the role of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations is simply to determine if there is sufficient probable cause for bringing an indictment against a suspect.

    The Court further stated, “By this standard, the Court finds probable cause to bind over private respondents to stand trial for the offenses charged, except for Placido L. Mapa, Jr. whom the Government had committed to exclude as party defendant or respondent in all PCGG-initiated civil cases and criminal proceedings or investigations in exchange for his having provided information relating to the prosecution of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act cases against the Marcoses in New York.”

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining when the prescriptive period begins for offenses involving the acquisition of behest loans, considered as ill-gotten wealth, specifically whether it starts from the date of the transaction or from the date of discovery of the offense.
    What is a behest loan? A behest loan generally refers to a loan granted under questionable circumstances, often characterized by being undercollateralized, involving cronies, or having the endorsement of high-ranking government officials.
    What is Republic Act No. 3019? Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes corrupt practices by public officers, including causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to private parties.
    What did the Ombudsman decide in this case? The Ombudsman initially dismissed the complaint, stating that the offenses had already prescribed because more than ten years had passed since the time of their commission and they deemed the Government did not suffer an injury.
    How did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court reversed the Ombudsman’s decision, ruling that the prescriptive period should be counted from the discovery of the offenses, not from the date of the transactions. This was because it was improbable for the State to discover these transactions on their own in the presence of collusion.
    What is the significance of the 1986 EDSA Revolution in this case? The 1986 EDSA Revolution is significant because the Court has ruled that for offenses committed before this event, the counting of the prescriptive period commences from the date of discovery of the offense after the revolution.
    Who was Placido L. Mapa, Jr. and why was he excluded? Placido L. Mapa, Jr. was one of the respondents but he was excluded because he had an agreement with the Government where he agreed to provide crucial information relating to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act cases against the Marcoses.
    What is the difference between Section 3(e) and Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019? Section 3(e) involves causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits to private parties, while Section 3(g) prohibits a public officer from entering into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the same, without a requirement to demonstrate that the government was unduly injured.

    This ruling clarifies the computation of the prescriptive period for offenses related to behest loans, affirming the State’s right to recover ill-gotten wealth. It underscores the importance of due diligence and accountability in government transactions, serving as a deterrent against corruption and abuse of power. This decision provides a clear framework for future cases involving similar issues, ensuring that public officials are held accountable for their actions and the State’s resources are protected.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 135703, April 15, 2009

  • サンドリガンバヤン裁判所の管轄：不正蓄財事件に関連するRTC判決の無効化

    本件は、不正蓄財訴訟に関与する隔離された会社が関与している分割訴訟において、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所が地方裁判所（RTC）の判決を無効にする管轄権を有するかどうかを判断することを目的としています。最高裁判所は、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所は、隔離された会社の管轄権を持つRTCの判決を取り消す管轄権を有すると判示しました。この判決は、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所が、不正蓄財を取り戻す取り組みに関連するケースにおいて、すべての事件について完全な権限を行使できることを明確にし、このようなケースに隔離資産が関与する場合に、RTCの判決を無効にできることを意味します。この判決は、分離命令の回避や、隔離資産の消滅、そして国家を傷つける可能性のある、不正蓄財回収に対するPCGGの取り組みを妨げる様々なスキームから、それらの資産を守る必要性を強調しています。

    不正蓄財、隔離、裁判所の管轄：司法パズル

    事実としては、ポール・C・デル・モラル、ホアン・アントニオ・デル・モラル、ホセ・ルイス・C・デル・モラルが、共和国（大統領善良政府委員会（PCGG）によって代表される）とサンドリガンバヤン裁判所に対して証明と禁止の嘆願書を最高裁判所に提出しました。中心的な問題は、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所が分割訴訟において地方裁判所（RTC）の判決を無効にする管轄権を有するかどうかでした。訴訟は、共同所有者が地方裁判所（RTC）に不動産の分割訴訟を提起したことで始まりました。一方、大統領善良政府委員会（PCGG）は、その会社の資産が違法な富の一部であると主張し、マウンテンビュー不動産会社を隔離しました。その結果、分割の訴えが提起され、裁判所はマウンテンビューが欠席した場合の判決を下し、マウンテンビューに不動産の一部を割り当てました。その後、大統領善良政府委員会（PCGG）は、マウンテンビューの割り当て面積が減らされたとして、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所にRTC判決の取り消しを求めました。請願者は、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所には管轄権がないと主張しましたが、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所は事件の管轄権を有することを決定しました。そのために、裁判所の決定の法的妥当性とサンドリガンバヤン裁判所の範囲が問題視されました。

    サンドリガンバヤン裁判所の管轄は、大統領令第1号、第2号、第14号、および1986年に発行された第14号Aに基づいて提起されたすべての民事訴訟を対象としており、マルコス大統領とその関係者の違法に取得したとされる資産の回収を指します。サンドリガンバヤン裁判所は、PD第1606条第4条（c）に規定されているように、R.A.第8249号によって修正された不正蓄財の訴訟に起因し、それに付随し、またはそれに関連するすべてをカバーします。サンドリガンバヤン裁判所の事件、PCGG vs.ペーニャ事件では、関連事件に対する影響について詳細に分析しました。

    この分析では、ソリアーノIII vs. ユソン事件で繰り返されているように、PCGGとサンドリガンバヤン裁判所の管轄に関するいくつかの原則について詳述します。

    …サンドリガンバヤン裁判所に与えられた独占的な管轄権は、明らかに主要な訴訟原因、つまり違法に取得したとされる富の回収だけでなく、「そのような事件から生じる、それに付随する、またはそれに関連するすべての事件」にも及びます。株式の売却をめぐる紛争、それに関連する補助的な令状または暫定的な救済の発行の妥当性、その隔離などです。

    したがって、提起された主な問題は、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所が判決を取り消す管轄権を行使できる範囲であり、裁判所の権限の範囲と制約、およびそれらが影響を与える個人の権利と義務との複雑な相互作用に関する重要な議論をもたらします。

    請願者が共和国 vs.サンドリガンバヤン裁判所およびサン・ミゲル・コーポレーション vs. カーン事件で引用した他の最高裁判所の判決では、これらの事件と本件とを区別する状況、たとえば後者が資産の分離、凍結、または暫定的な買収に関するものではないことを明らかにすることによって、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所の管轄に対するそのような制約に光が当てられました。この差別化は、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所の事件に関する判決を下す際の最高裁判所の差別的アプローチを強調し、訴えられている問題の性質、資産の分離への直接的な影響、PCGGのmandate内でのより広範な救済への影響など、さまざまな要素に依存することを示しています。

    この姿勢から発展した、資産が適切に会計処理されない場合に「フィリピン共和国に対する損害または偏見」を引き起こす可能性がある隔離された資産を熱心に保護する必要性についてサンドリガンバヤン裁判所は議論しました。その上、BASECO vs. PCGG事件では、不正蓄財の資産と企業の維持におけるPCGGの重要な役割を定義しました。

    裁判所は、政府が単に株主であるという理由で、政府にはマウンテンビューを傷つける可能性のある判決を無効にする訴訟を起こす権限がないという申し立てを反論しました。マウンテンビューのすべての資産、財産、記録、書類は、分割訴訟の開始前の1986年5月9日に隔離の令状の対象となったことが判明しました。これらの事実により、裁判所はPCGGが財産の保全において正当な理由で行動していたと判示し、RTCの判決に対する控訴を認めることが適切であることを裏付けました。最後に、ホリデイ・イン vs.サンドリガンバヤン裁判所とサン・ミゲル・コーポレーション vs.カーンは訴訟にも適用されないため、管轄の複雑さをさらに実証することができませんでした。

    よくある質問

    この訴訟の重要な問題は何でしたか？ サンドリガンバヤン裁判所には、不正蓄財訴訟の対象である隔離された会社が含まれる、州裁判所による訴訟を取り消す管轄権がありますか。この判決は、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所が不正蓄財とみなされる資産に関わる事件に関連する問題に対処する権限に影響を与えました。
    PCGGとは何ですか？その訴訟での役割は何でしたか？ 大統領善良政府委員会（PCGG）は、違法とみなされる富を回収する任務を負う政府機関です。マウンテンビューは違法に蓄積されたと見なされている資産を含む資産を隔離していたため、PCGGはマウンテンビューに悪影響を及ぼした訴訟を無効にする法的権利があると判断しました。
    隔離とは、訴訟にどのように影響するのですか？ 隔離とは、国家の富を違法に得られたとして非難されている可能性のある不正な行動からの資産を保護するために、大統領善良政府委員会（PCGG）によって資産を管理下に置くことを意味します。不正蓄財からの富を保持している人は誰でも、資産の隠蔽や悪用を停止することで処罰されます。
    この判決を裏付けた理由は？ 裁判所は、隔離は国家の経済的苦難を緩和するためにマルコス政権から違法に得られた資産を取り戻すことに関連するため、事件がPCGG管轄下にあると考えていたため、不正蓄財であるという事実によって支配されています。
    共和国 vs.サンドリガンバヤン裁判所（G.R. Nos. 96073など）は、訴訟にどのように影響しましたか？ ケース共和国 vs.サンドリガンバヤン裁判所本質的な要素に関係がないため、ここでは関連性がありませんでした。これらのケースは、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所の管轄が、不正蓄財訴訟に関与するプロパティの隔離、凍結、または一時的な支配を処理しないことを指摘した訴訟のカテゴリーにのみ該当しました。
    サン・ミゲル・コーポレーション vs. カーン事件（G.R. No. 85339）の教訓は何ですか？ 繰り返しますが、最高裁判所は事件の実体がサンドリガンバヤン裁判所の訴訟管轄に該当するかどうかという事件固有の要素によって差別化されていることを明らかにしているため、これはこの訴訟には適用されません。つまり、違反された申し立てはサンミゲル社の資金を誤用したディレクターの事件で、マルコスの資産不正事件に関連付けられるものはありません。
    マウンテンビュー事件は最終的にどうなったのでしょうか？ 最高裁判所はサンドリガンバヤン裁判所の訴訟に有利な判決を下し、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所には裁判所の変更を無効にする管轄権があり、したがって共和国が訴訟を開始する資格が与えられました。

    この判決は、訴訟に関連する隔離資産に関与する、地方裁判所の判決におけるサンドリガンバヤン裁判所の管轄を明らかにしています。また、資産が破壊、損失、または不正の被害者となることから保護されるという認識も強化されています。不正蓄財と国家経済とが複雑に結びついているため、サンドリガンバヤン裁判所の判決の訴訟管轄を注意深く解釈および実施することで、公益のために国家資産を正当かつ適切に使用できるようになることを意味しています。

    本裁定の特定の状況への適用に関するお問い合わせは、お問い合わせ または frontdesk@asglawpartners.com までASG法律事務所にご連絡ください。

    免責事項：この分析は情報提供のみを目的として提供されており、法的助言を構成するものではありません。 お客様の状況に合わせた特定の法的指導については、資格のある弁護士にご相談ください。
    出典: Del Moral v. Republic, G.R. No. 140301, 2005年4月26日